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Abstract
Under the Eighth Amendment, the death penalty is in and of itself not considered cruel
and unusual punishment. Although the death penalty is frequently attacked for the numerous
death row exonerations (more than 150 in the United States alone), lack of evidence supporting
the idea that the death penalty deters crime, and marginalized groups being more likely to receive
this sentencing, the death penalty still remains on solid constitutional ground. In fact, the
arguments that pose the biggest threat to the constitutionality of the death penalty tend to revolve
around the potential risk of substantial pain while executing an offender, or the type of offender
that can or cannot be executed. One argument that has not received as much traction, but rests
on similar logic to those that have, revolves around the constitutionality of sitting on death row.
Specifically, the argument that this thesis will address is whether the time spent on death row,
not the execution itself, violates the Eighth Amendment? This question will be addressed through
three-parts: I. Death Penalty in Modern U.S. Jurisprudence, II. Overlooked Problematic Effects
of Death Row and III. Time on Death Row as a Possible Constitutional Violation. Part I. reviews
the literature of death penalty jurisprudence and is divided into three smaller parts. Part II.
presents an analysis of death row and the effects it has on inmates. Part III. analyzes connections
between inmates’ mental health and their competency.
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Introduction
The United States remains the only developed nation in the Western hemisphere to
continue to administer the death penalty as the highest form of punishment. When studying
modern day jurisprudence surrounding execution the question arises: why does the United States
deviate from other Western nations’ philosophies and principles? One simplified answer to that
is: under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, it is legal for States to execute
as a punishment for a crime. If there is one thing the US Constitution is known for, it would be
for its vagueness which encourages broad interpretation and room for laws to evolve with
present-day societal values and norms. In that respect, for years the death penalty as a form of
punishment has been a topic of review in many important Supreme Court decisions.
Under the Eighth Amendment, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted” (US. Const. amend. VIII). When briefly
examining Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, Gregg v. Georgia (1976) reversed the Supreme
Court’s prior decision of eradicating the application of the death penalty and found that the death
penalty as a punishment did not violate the constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Georgia Supreme Court and had held that the jury’s review of the crime, the
nature of the crime and individual characteristics of the defendant, along with the provided
method of review did not violate the Constitution. When litigators bring lawsuits surrounding the
lawfulness of the death penalty, a frequent concern is whether “cruel and unusual punishment”
has been inflicted. However, most of the arguments presented revolve around the potential risk
of substantial pain while executing an offender, or the type of offender that can or cannot be
executed (Furman v. Georgia, 1972).
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Since capital punishment is considered constitutional, surprisingly, not many lawsuits
have been brought up arguing the constitutionality of sitting on death row. Although common
justifications for administering the death penalty are that it serves as a form of deterrence and
provides victims with a sense of closure, many cases have been presented questioning who
should be eligible for death and how prison personnel should execute. Even though the
application of the death penalty and those who would be considered eligible are constantly
reviewed, a glaring component courts seemingly glosses over is the actual time spent serving this
sentence. As of now, administering capital punishment does not constitute as “cruel and unusual
punishment,” however, the conditions and time spent are basically ignored by U.S. Courts. The
time spent on death row creates many lasting, severe psychological effects that are overlooked
by many courts. The ambiguity of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment and the constant evolving standards presents an underexplored concept:
whether the time spent on death row, not the execution itself, violates the Eighth Amendment?
This thesis will attempt to defend the contention that the length of time spent awaiting
execution needs to be cured and reevaluated or else this remains unconstitutional, therefore,
violating the Eighth Amendment. This thesis will examine capital punishment and death row
through three-parts: I. Death Penalty in Modern U.S. Legality, II. Overlooked Problematic
Effects of Death Row, and III. Time on Death Row as a Possible Constitutional Violation. Part I.
reviews the literature of death penalty jurisprudence and is divided into three smaller parts. Part
II. presents an analysis of death row and the effects it has on inmates. Part III. analyzes
connections between inmates’ mental health and their competency.
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I. Death Penalty in Modern U.S. Jurisprudence
The intent of this literature review is to enquire whether or not placing convicted felons
on death row violates their Eighth amendment and constitutes as cruel and unusual punishment
through a review of precedents, legislation, social and political climates. This literature review
will give an overview of the death penalty, eighth amendment, and the effects it has on inmates.
This will be divided into three parts: (A) History of Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, (B)
Prominent Disputes, and (C) What Determines What is Considered “Cruel and Unusual” with
Respect to Executions?
A. History of Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
Modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence begins with Furman v. Georgia (1972). Furman
was a Supreme Court ruling which reevaluated what is considered cruel and unusual punishment
and set the tone for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence thereafter. William Henry Furman, an
African American, was convicted of murdering William Mickie in Savannah, Georgia while
attempting a burglary in August of 1967. When he tried to flee the home invasion, he exclaimed
that the shot he fired was merely an accident. Furman then became eligible for the death penalty
under Georgia’s state law for the murder of William Mickie. Along with this case, Jackson v.
Georgia and Branch v. Texas, were also brought on a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Unlike the defendant in Furman, Lucius Jackson and Elmer Branch were both convicted
of rape. The Supreme Court struck down the three death sentences, with the majority finding that
the death penalty violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the
application of the death penalty was erratic and discriminatory since it was imposed on very few,
rare cases and was primarily inflicted upon certain minority groups.
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The societal response of Furman, Carol and Jordan Steiker (2014) found that the decision
was met with “consternation and even outrage” (C. S. & J. M. Steiker, 2014). The public’s
disdain of the decision in Furman was largely due to the new political reality of crime and
punishment of that time. During the 1960s and 1970s, “homicides and serious violent crimes
were among the offenses that rose the fastest, and urban centers went from being relatively safe
to being notoriously crime-ridden” (p. 191). Along with the rise of crimes arose the trajectory of
the growing demand for policies that were “tough on crime” and combated the “war on drugs.”
This led to the reinstatement of capital punishment in 1976 through Gregg v. Georgia.
Four years after Furman was instated, Tory Gregg was convicted of armed robbery and
murder and was sentenced to death in the State of Georgia. Gregg had murdered Fred Edward
Simmons and Bob Durwood Moore and then robbed from them and stole their vehicle. At that
time, after the instatement of Furman, states such as Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina,
and Louisiana each amended their death penalty statutes to meet the Furman guidelines. Along
with Gregg, five other defendants with the same conviction brought a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court asking the court to review Furman and proclaim that the death penalty was
unconstitutional since it violated the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.
In Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the court found that the death penalty as a punishment did not
violate the constitution and affirmed the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court. The Court held
that the jury’s review of the crime, the nature of the crime and individual characteristics of the
defendant, along with the provided method of review did not violate the Constitution.
In Gregg v. Georgia the court praised Georgia's statute, finding that it served as a check
against arbitrariness and eliminated the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the
decision of a deviant jury. Although this was approved by the Court, in a law review written by
8

Robert J. Smith (2015), Smith believes that “Gregg did not demonstrate that post-Furman
statutes such as Georgia's had eradicated arbitrariness” (p. 1159). Smith divides crime-based
arbitrariness into two subsections: 1. Narrowing and Numerousness, and 2. Meaningful
Appellate Review.
Under his first subsection: Narrowing and Numerousness, Smith contends that the narrowing
of the death penalty eligibility needs to be fixed. Currently, in determining whether arbitrariness
exists, the courts focus first on eligibility and then assesses the frequency of death sentencing
within the class of eligible offenders. However, Smith explains that the narrowing requirement
fails at limiting and restricting death-eligibility because legislatures have expanded the list of
eligible crimes and increased the number of aggravating circumstances. His main argument is
that arbitrariness has changed since Furman. Before Furman was instated, there was a lack of
standards guiding the judge or jury tasked with making the death determination, and the risks
associated with arbitrariness pre-Furman are not the same as today. Today, the death penalty is
prohibited for non-homicide offenses, and there are standards in placed to guide judges and
juries. In Smith’s second subsection: Meaningful Appellate Review, Smith contends that the
continued existence of arbitrariness in regard to the death penalty is due to “the failure of
appellate courts to engage in the type of meaningful appellate review envisioned in Gregg” (p.
1162). Similar to problems seen in the narrowing requirement, the current proportionality
review instated in Gregg suffers the same dilemma: arbitrariness has shifted its shape. Today,
there is less need for monitoring because the death penalty is limited to homicide offenses and
then is handled in a bifurcated trial where jurors are instructed to consider both aggravating and
mitigating evidence (Smith, 2015). As opposed to pre-Furman and post-Gregg, monitoring
arbitrariness is both time-consuming and difficult to do on an ongoing basis Smith argues that
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both the narrowing requirement and proportionality review “promotes consistency but fails to
address excessiveness adequately” (p. 1163).
Another issue that has somewhat evolved since Furman is crime-based race discrimination.
Race discrimination was one of the main themes that emerged from Furman, and the justices at
the time believed that it contributed to some of the lack of rational and consistent results. The
death penalty’s jurisprudence after Furman demonstrated that race discrimination was a huge
influence in that justices’ decision through Coker v. Georgia. In that case, the Supreme Court
held that the death penalty is an excessive punishment for the crime of rape. This relates to
crime-based race discrimination because black defendants disproportionately received the death
sentence in most capital rape cases. Smith also cites McCleskey v. Kemp as the first time the
Supreme Court addressed race discrimination. The argument made in McCleskey was that
defendants of color that killed a white victim were disproportionately sentenced to death.
McCleskey also provides a statistical analysis that defendants were sentenced to death 4.3 times
more often if the victim was white than black victims. McCleskey also found that black
defendants who killed a victim that was white were more likely to receive the death penalty.
However, the Court recognized that these studies were not sufficient in proving race
discrimination in McCleskey. Just like arbitrariness, Smith argues that crime-based race
discrimination is not that same as when Furman instated it. He argues that (i) it is more difficult
to pinpoint race as a factor that explains death sentencing inconsistencies, (ii) the Court's recent
retrenchment from voting rights and affirmative action would make reforming or overturning the
death penalty highly unlikely, and (iii) this retrenchment from voting rights and affirmative
action would make reforming or overturning the death penalty highly unlikely, and would also
call for a highly unlikely change in the criminal justice system.
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The present state of the Eighth Amendment in regard to the death penalty simply states that
there should be no excessive bail and it prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. When reviewing
what constitutes as “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth amendment, the
Constitution does not explicitly say. When analyzing the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
Eighth Amendment, Ingraham v. Wright (1977) attempts to confine it as the criminal process by
“(1) limiting kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes, (2)
proscribing punishment grossly disproportionate to severity of crime, and (3) imposing
substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such” (Ingraham v. Wright,
1977).
B. Prominent Disputes
The controversies addressed in Furman and Gregg revolving around the Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence have opened the gates to new arguments and stoked the flames of old arguments
regarding the necessity of the death penalty. In a law review written by Kevin Barry (2014), he
contends that the most prominent challenges introduced against the death penalty, revolve
around these three common stances: “(1) the death penalty is invariably, or per se,
unconstitutional; (2) the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to a particular defendant
based on the character of the defendant’s crime or a characteristic of the defendant; and (3) the
death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to a particular defendant based on the procedures
used to sentence the person to death” (p. 359). Echoing Barry (2014), much of the literature
indicates that, when discussing why one may be for or against capital punishment, the four most
prominent disputes addressed are: (1) whether the death penalty actually deters crime, (2)
whether the death penalty provides victims with closure, (3) whether imposing the death penalty
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is too risky and treacherous, (4) whether people even have the right to sentence an individual to
death (Ichinose, 2017).
(1) Whether the Death Penalty Actually Deters Crime
The most prominent justification for the death penalty is that it deters crime. This
justification mostly stems from views and perception from the public on how the death penalty
can serve as deterrent for future offenders. However, this notion itself is already problematic. In
a study examining public opinion of the death penalty conducted by Falco and Freiburger (2011),
they concluded that although that the majority of the public are in favor of the death penalty but,
their opinions on whether it deters crime are inconsistent. In their research they concluded that
there needs to be more comprehensive research that would be able to encapsulate the complexity
of individuals views. With that being said, although there are numerous supporters in favor of the
death penalty, the basis of its justification that it serves as a deterrent seems to stem from mostly
public opinion. In a contention by Dr. Robert Bohm on whether the death penalty should be
allowed, he stated there is not any evidence that supports the death penalty demonstrating a
marginal deterrent effect (Lee & Bohm & Pazzani, 2013). Similar to what Bohm contended,
studies seeking to confirm whether the death penalty serves as a deterrent, the findings tend to be
minimal and inconsistent (Lee & Bohm & Pazzani, 2013).
Most studies that attempt to explain whether capital punishment deters crime result in
findings that are insignificant. In research conducted by Bailey (1980), he states in order for
deterrence to be effective, it must be “(1) severe, (2) administered with certainty, (3)
administered swiftly, (4) and administered publicly” (p. 4). The purpose of the research in that
study was to examine the celerity of death penalty sentences administered and whether there was
any correlation between deterrence. In one of Bailey’s analysis of sanctions and homicides rates
12

in 1960-61, in both measures, his findings did not support that there is a positive association
between the certainty and celerity of the death penalty since none of the sanctions coefficients he
measured were statistically significant. The rest of his study follows the previous results.
Although this was an analysis of insignificant findings from the 1980s, there are still only limited
findings supporting the majority consensus of administering the death penalty serves as a
deterrent (Lee & Bohm & Pazzani, 2013).
(2) Whether the Death Penalty Provides Victims with Closure
The Victims’ Rights Movement began its rise about over 40 years ago as a movement that
demanded victims’ testimonies to be heard and influence decisions made in court. It may seem a
bit redundant for a movement to exist that solely demands for victims’ testimonies to be sought
when offenders and victims are always conjoined in a criminal trial. However, it is the sense of
grief and rage that are introduced in cases that invites conflicting views on the level of influence
victims provide in lawsuits.
Payne v. Tennessee (1991) is the landmark Supreme Court decision that reversed established
death penalty jurisprudence in the United States and influenced the course of the Victims Rights
Movement. Payne allowed for victim impact statements to be brought in capital cases. Although
Payne can be considered a major triumph for the Victims’ Rights Movement, the concept of
“vengeance” in these cases emerged.
When examining capital crime lawsuits, modern legality tries to avoid retribution as the
preeminent decision when inflicting punishment on an offender (Sarat, 1997). Although
retribution is often thought of as a synonym to revenge, the philosopher Robert Nozick contends
that there is a key distinction between these two terms and how the concept of retribution should
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be treated in modern legality. Nozick’s main argument is that the key distinction between
retribution and vengeance is “passion and reason.” Nozick’s contention is also supported in other
academia, “When the victim's voice is silent, punishment cannot restore to the victim a sense of
being in control or being able to exert power” (Sarat, 1997). Through providing a distinction
between retribution and vengeance contributes to the argument that allowing for victim impact
statements does not inflict punishment through revenge but rather creating the best legal efforts
to ensure that the victims receive relief. With the decision of Payne and the persistence of
Victims’ Rights Movement introduces another concept that the courts have to consider, victim
closure.
In regard to arguing the necessity of capital punishment, a common stance people tend to
propose is the idea of victim closure. Eaton and Christensen (2014) define closure as a term
which describes the “desired state for the family members of murder victims, but also as a
rationale for imposing the death penalty and for allowing co-victims to witness the execution”
(p.328). They argue that this type of rhetoric is problematic for several reasons. The concept of
victim closure creates the expectation that after witnessing an execution, a victim may gain a
sense of relief and resolution, but Eaton and Christensen contend that this is not necessarily
always the case. The main argument that drove their study was that victim closure is too abstract
of a term to be used generally among all victims and reasons to promote capital punishment. In
their qualitative findings, about 23% specifically used the term ‘closure.’ They then divided this
group into two groups: those who stated that they gained a sense of closure and those who
explicitly stated that they did not gain/experience closure. Along with this, another subset group
was created, with 9% expressing closure without outright deliberating stating it. Eaton and
Christensen both admit that it is difficult to quantify and define the concept of closure through
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their study due to the influence of the media. In their findings, they could not accurately code
explicit closure due to the fact that the mention of closure from the co-victim were mostly direct
responses to a question posed to them by a media representative. This also affected their study
since media reports tend to not provide the questions in their reports. The influence of
media/media representatives greatly impacted their study since they could not necessarily
estimate the number of victims who spontaneously mentioned closure after they witnessed the
execution.
In debates that attempt to assess how imperative the damages and suffering of victims when
reaching a ruling, there is not many significant findings that fully supports the concept of victim
closure. Despite the wide public support for Victim Impact Statements and keeping capital
punishment instated, to enforce the death penalty on the basis that it would provide “victim
closure” when the concept itself has not been well defined is a bit challenging.
(3) Whether Imposing the Death Penalty is too Risky and Treacherous
On June 26, 2019, Charles Ray Finch was exonerated after spending 43 years in prison for a
crime he did not commit. (“Charles Ray Finch Exonerated 43 Years After,” 2019). Finch is now
the 166th innocent person exonerated from death row in the U.S. A common argument brought
by opponents of the death penalty are the potential risk it imposes (Blackerby, 2003). This often
leads to a somewhat philosophical debate defended on both sides of the spectrum: is it justified
to continue placing convicted criminals on death row as punishment even with the looming
potential risk it invites.
Blackerby (2003) attempts to prevent wrongful convictions through examining current U.S.
criminal justice system in her law review, Life after Death Row: Preventing Wrongful Capital
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Convictions and Restoring Innocence after Exoneration. Blackerby provides examples of some
the contributors that lead up to wrongful convictions in capital cases, and most of the examples
provided were incompetent administration procedurals. She first introduces “faulty forensic
science,” where there have been many cases of individuals lying about their credentials and
presenting false, misguided findings. Blackerby uses Joyce Gilchrist as an example of a recent
case of a “forensic scientist” who lied about their credentials. Gilchrist worked with the
Oklahoma City Police Department and provided testimony which helped send 23 defendants to
death row. Now all the cases are being reexamined since there is now evidence that has been
provided that Gilchrist gave false or flawed testimony throughout her 21-year career as a forensic
scientist. Blackerby then moves on to misconduct performed by police and prosecutors. In many
cases, misconduct or mistakes occur at times where it is safe to assume the system should be
accurate. Many are wrongfully convicted at the investigation stage where a police officer
identifies the wrong criminal. Another common cause that leads to a wrongful conviction are
prosecutors’ persistence to pursue a case even when there is substantial evidence of the
defendant's innocence. Aside from prosecutorial causes, many defendants who are wrongfully
convicted tend to have inadequate counsel. These common errors found in the criminal justice
system further demonstrates that there is substantial risk in administering the death penalty.
(4) Does One have the Right to Sentence an Individual to Death?
Gregg v. Georgia reaffirmed that capital punishment is a constitutional and justifiable means
of punishment since it does not violate the eighth amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment
clause. Most lawsuits focus on whether the “cruel and unusual” occurs when inflicting capital
punishment, however, these cases tend to fail to bring up the argument whether if a State should
have the “right” to conduct an execution. This may be largely due to the vagueness of the United
16

States constitution and the lack of written law examining the grand philosophical dispute of
whether States should have the “right” to carry out the act of executing an individual.
Japanese philosopher, Masaki Ichinose (2017), believes that there are three chronological
stages as to why modern society as whole feels the need to implement the death penalty. The first
stage he provides is what he calls the “Harm Stage.” This stage goes hand in hand with the
Victims’ Rights Movement beliefs because the direct focus is on the victims who suffered from
the harm. The following phase is the, “Blame Stage.” This extends to the period of the execution
and relies heavily on retributive justice. The final phase is the “Danger Stage.” This phase solely
focuses on crime deterrence and the imminent danger society is in when a capital crime has
occurred. This justification examines both society and the crime and how to prevent a crime of
this scale from happening in order to fulfill a “unilateral goal” of potentially protecting victims
of future crime.
When examining capital punishment, most arguments tend to have retributive justice as the
underlying justification. Although it can be argued that almost all lawsuits have some sort of
retributive themes underlying them since there is always some sort of victim suffering, if the goal
for U.S. courts is to avoid inflicting punishment that adheres to a retributive form of justice, then
it can be argued that there needs to be a reevaluation of capital punishment in the U.S. if
recurring themes of retributivism continue to appear.
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C. What Determines What is Considered “Cruel and Unusual” with Respect to
Executions?
As mentioned earlier, when reviewing what constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment”
under the Eighth amendment, the Constitution gives no explicit answer. When analyzing the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of Eighth Amendment, Ingraham v Wright (1977) attempts
to confine it as the criminal process by “(1) limiting kinds of punishment that can be imposed on
those convicted of crimes, (2) proscribing punishment grossly disproportionate to severity of
crime, and (3) imposing substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such.”
There are specific rules addressing whether an execution should be carried out and how the
death penalty is mandated. The “Eighth Amendment mandates that court carefully consider both
character and record of individual offender and circumstances of particular offense before
upholding infliction of death penalty.” State v. Windsor (1985). Many Supreme Court rulings
address who is “eligible” to receive capital punishment and how this punishment is executed. In
Atkins v. Virginia (1989), the Supreme Court prohibited executing offenders with an intellectual
disability. In Roper v. Simmons (2005) the Supreme Court made it unconstitutional to execute
offenders who were under 18 at the time their crime was committed.
There are also provisions states have to adhere to in regard to the certain type of
murder a mentally competent adult commits. In Coker v. Georgia (1977), the Supreme
Court prohibited executions for rape when the victim is not killed. Kennedy v. Louisiana
(2008) limited a state to impose the death penalty to individuals committing a crime that
resulted in the death of the victim and to crimes against the state such as espionage, and
treason.
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Since the death penalty is not considered unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment, the
methods of execution were an important distinction that had to be addressed. In Baze v. Rees
(2008) the Court established “To constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the execution method
must present "substantial" or "objectively intolerable" risk of serious harm; a state's refusal to
adopt proffered alternative procedures, without legitimate penological justification for adhering
to its current method of execution, may violate Eighth Amendment only where alternative
procedure is not only feasible and readily implemented, but also, in fact significantly reduces
substantial risk of severe pain.” (Baze v. Rees, 2008). Methods that were defined by the Supreme
Court as posing a substantial risk of severe pain are addressed in Wilkerson v. Utah (1878) which
recognized that drawing and quartering, public dissection, burning alive, or disembowelment
constitute as cruel and unusual punishment.
Although plenty of established rules and regulations exist on how the death penalty is
mandated and how capital punishment should be executed, there is little to no explanation which
addresses whether the time being spent on death row could potentially cause an inmate to suffer
mental illness. Under the Eighth Amendment and preceding landmark cases, many of them do
not address the imminent psychological effects. The few cases that do attempt to try this fail to
decide whether it constitutes “cruel and unusual.” In Porter v. Singletary (1995), the petitioner
failed to prove that his prolonged stay on death row rose to the level of “cruel and unusual”
because he had no evidence that the delays made by the state demonstrated were attributable to
negligence. In Porter, there most likely would have needed evidence provided that demonstrated
negligence resulting in the causation of severe emotional distress through negligent action (Legal
Information Institute, n.d.). However, Porter failed to prove that lengthened stay on death row
were attributable to negligence resulting in cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. There are

19

many other preceding cases which attempt to argue the delay of a death row sentence, but not
many argue whether or not such prolonged sentencing can be deemed as psychologically taxing
(Lackey v. State, 1995).

II. Overlooked Problematic Effects of Death Row
When overviewing capital punishment in the United States as whole, there are variety of
aspects examined that are used as arguments for or against the justification of the death penalty.
However, whereas most justifications solely focus on whether the U.S. should be allowed to
execute, there is very limited research and argument that focuses on the current state of capital
punishment and the effects that it has on those convicted inmates. Since the Eighth Amendment
is conspicuously ambiguous, it allows for underexplored concepts to emerge, such as: whether
the time spent on death row, not the execution itself, violates the Eighth Amendment?
A. Death Row Phenomenon and Syndrome
Harrison and Tamony (2010) attempt to define and address the ambiguity of the concepts
of Death Row Phenomenon and Death Row Syndrome. Although the concepts are often used
interchangeably, Harrison and Tamony defines Death Row Syndrome as “the consequential
psychological illness that can occur as a result of Death Row phenomenon” (p. 2) and Death
Row Phenomenon as “the harmful effects of the conditions experienced on death row, including
solitary confinement and the mental anxiety that prisoners experience whilst waiting for their
death sentence to be imposed”(p. 2). Since both concepts are similar, they made sure to
distinguish key aspects of these terms through a more detailed description of Death Row
Syndrome as the “resulting psychological harms of that experience, or the set of psychological
20

effects for inmates that can result from extended periods of time spent on death row, in harsh
conditions, coupled with the unique stresses of living under [a] sentence of death”(p.2).
Though some psychiatrists and academics recognizing the presence of Death Row
Syndrome, Harrison and Tamony admittedly note that it is not considered a mental health
disorder by the American Psychiatric Association (APA). It is important to note within these
definitions that there are smaller concepts that accompany them. When attempting to define
Death Row Phenomenon it can be separated into three categories: “the harsh, dehumanizing
conditions of imprisonment itself; the sheer length of time spent living under such conditions;
and the psychological repercussions associated with a death sentence” (p. 3). Harrison and
Tamony use these circumstances to further illustrate their article.
The concept of Death Row Syndrome mostly is the effects of solitary confinement has on
a prisoner. When attempting to diagnose this “syndrome,” one would have to examine individual
and environmental factors that has the potential to psychologically damage an individual.
Harrison and Tamony does this through describing a case study of an anonymous prisoner placed
on death row. The inmate who currently resides in Sussex State Penitentiary, Virginia, typical
daily schedule involves spending approximately 24 hours in 7x9 prison cell, one hour of solitary
exercise, time to shower, meals that are handed to him through his cell door and confined limited
visitations. Through this case study, Harrison and Tamony found this inmate’s mental state had
deteriorated, demonstrating symptoms of depression and active psychosis. This inmate’s mental
health team states that the lack of human contact has caused him to exhibit unusual behavior
such as paranoid delusions and hallucinatory thoughts.
While Death Row Syndrome is the exacerbated psychological effects of being on death
row, Death Row Phenomenon is the unnerving conditions that provokes the human psyche. This
21

is mostly as a result from the delay and time period awaiting execution. The lingering
anticipation and uncertainty of an execution date, along with spending years of considerably
inhumane conditions further heightens psychological illnesses. Although there is some
plausibility to the concept of Death Row Phenomenon, so far there has not been case which has
ruled the delay of an execution to be considered unconstitutional.
B. The Effects of Solitary Confinement
When sentenced to death row, convicted felons are sent to solitary confinement. In a legal
digest by Wyatt and Kapoor (2018) they use the appeal, Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (2017), to examine the constitutionality of the practice of holding
inmates in solitary confinement through the observation of the psychological harms it leaves.
In Williams, Craig Williams appealed his criminal conviction and was granted a new
sentencing hearing. Although he was granted a new sentence, he remained held in solitary
confinement on death row for another six years, due to Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’
policy which required that, once persons are placed on death row, “the secretary [of corrections]
shall, until infliction of the death penalty or until lawful discharge of custody, keep the inmate in
solitary confinement” (61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4303 (2009)). Shawn Walker who was convicted of
first-degree murder, and sentenced to death, was also held in solitary confinement after his death
sentence had been vacated. They both alleged that their eight and fourteenth amendment rights
had been violated due to their continued placement in solitary confinement after they had been
granted resentencing hearings and filed a suit against the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). The basis of this allegation was that “the conditions
of long-term solitary confinement had caused severe physical and psychological harm, including
emotional distress, insomnia, and body tremors.”
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that, “Messrs. Williams’ and
Walker’s indefinite, long-term isolation was much more severe than ordinary prison life, and
therefore they did have a protected liberty interest in avoiding such conditions.” Williams allows
Wyatt and Kapoor to open up a discussion on the damaging psychological effects solitary
confinement of prison inmates. Several organizations have taken stances on the aspects of
solitary confinement such as the American Psychiatric Association recommending limiting the
use of prolonged (longer than 30 days) solitary confinement for adult inmates with serious
mental illness, and the National Commission on Correctional Health Care believing that it is
cruel and inhumane to leave inmates (with or with mental illness) kept in solitary confinement
for longer than 15 days. Although Williams dealt with the restriction of solitary confinement of
death sentences that had been vacated, the underlying question Wyatt and Kapoor were
attempting to leave open for discussion was the “permissibility of solitary confinement for death
row prisoners whose sentences have not been vacated and who are awaiting execution” (p. 119).
C. The Lingering Anticipation that Deteriorates the Human Psyche.
Inmates placed on death row typically spend 15 years awaiting their execution. When
being confined to prolonged isolation anticipating the inevitable, one can be easily susceptible to
psychological disorders. The deterioration of the human psyche can be best be seen with the high
suicide rates in federal prisons in the United States. Although inmates placed on death row are
surrounded by a greater level of surveillance as opposed to other prisoners, death row inmates
have higher suicide rates than both the average prison population and the general public. In one
literature review, Tartaro and Lester (2016), conducted a study that presented suicide data for
death row inmates from the years 1978 through 2010. When examining suicide rates on death
row the variables they used in their study were the number of offenders sentenced to death each
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year, number of changes in one’s sentence, and the number of executions each year. The aim of
this study was to hypothesize that “the number of executions each year and the number of new
prisoners sentenced to death did not contribute to the prediction of the death row suicide rate” (p.
1656).
Tartaro and Lester (2016) used data obtained from the annual U.S. Department of Justice
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) Capital Punishment series from 1978– 2010. Between 1978 to
2010, the mean rate of suicide on death row was 129.7 per 100,00 per year. Although, since the
70s, the average rate of suicides to occur on death row have shown gradual decrease, in
comparison to inmates not placed in death row and individuals outside the prison system, they
found that the mean suicide rate for inmates placed on death row were significantly higher than
both the rate of males over the age of 15 in and outside of prison.
In recent years, courts have demonstrated willingness to award damages and injunctive
relief for some lawsuits against prison personnel for damages caused in suicides or attempted
suicides, however in most cases, it’s very difficult to win this sort of lawsuit with the limited
research and wide amount of variables that are difficult to pinpoint. Although it is widely known
that death row inmates’ living conditions differ from the regular prison populations, such as
being separated from other inmates and experiencing long periods of isolation and inactivity,
several variables are introduced that makes it challenging to determine the conditions of prison
settings and the psychological impact it leaves on an inmate placed on death row. Tartaro and
Lester indicate that with the 35 states that currently implement the death penalty, it is hard to
generalize the conditions and effects of inmates placed on death row because some conditions,
activities, and services are exceptional to certain state’s system.
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III. Time on Death Row as a Possible Constitutional Violation
A. Competency of Inmates on Death Row
The Eighth Amendment explicitly states that “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Under this Amendment it
forbids a state from executing a prisoner who is insane since one should not execute a person
who has no comprehension of why he/she has been punished. Ford v. Wainwright (1986). The
US Supreme Court has held that death row inmates may have the right to waive their appeal if
they are deemed competent. However, this raises many concerns due to the increasing prevalent
issues of mental illness among death row inmates. As mentioned previously, Death Row
Syndrome is defined as “the consequential psychological illness that can occur as a result of
Death Row Phenomenon” (p. 2). Although Death Row Syndrome is not considered as a
psychological illness under the American Psychological Association, the very existence of the
idea of Death Row Syndrome is very concerning due to courts potentially sentencing
incompetent inmates to death. This can be considered as highly problematic when examining the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of having difficulty defining what is considered competency.
Rees v. Peyton is an illustrative example of the US Supreme Court’s inability to
determine a defendant’s competency. In Rees, the defendant requested to withdraw his petition
of certiorari to the Supreme Court. However, his counsel was highly against this request because
they believed that Rees was not mentally capable of making that decision. This led the court to
being unable to determine how to dispose his petition. Rather than determining a standard, the
court sent this back to the district court to reach a decision of whether Rees had the capacity to
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appreciate and make a rational decision. Rees is just one example of the court’s difficulty of
defining the mental competency of an inmate facing death row.
Since the Supreme Court did not further examine Rees’ motivations for waiving his right,
they failed to explain whether his choice to waive his appeal came from a place of rational
decision-making or from his mental illness. With the seemingly “ambiguity” of defining Death
Row Syndrome and courts’ disdain of addressing this issue, ignoring this syndrome may result in
the execution of incompetent inmates. If the concept of Death Row Syndrome truly exists, that
would mean it would fit the definition of mental illnesses limiting the exercise of free will
necessary to make rational decisions. This would mean the US courts have been deliberately
violating inmates’ Eight Amendment rights. Although they are not considered executioners, the
roles of physicians are detriment when it comes to the execution of an inmate sentenced to death
row.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." Therefore, courts have recognized that an individual(s)
has the right to refuse medical treatment is protected under this amendment (U.S. Const. amend.
XIV). This becomes increasingly relevant regarding death row inmates who are deemed as
incompetent. As of today, it is considered legal for physicians to practice the involuntary use of
medication to treat their mentally ill patients in both civil and correctional environments.
However, this right afforded to medical practitioners has caused the determination of whether an
inmate displays a level of competency to become quite murky. Ford v. State is an example of the
murkiness of the determination of competency displayed by an inmate. Alvin Ford was convicted
of the murder of a police officer and was sentenced to death in 1974. Just like in Rees, Ford’s
attorneys also questioned his competency to be executed. However, after the psychiatrists
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brought by the State had examined Ford, their diagnosis concluded that he was competent, thus
based upon their opinions, Ford was sentenced to death. Through an amicus brief the American
Psychiatric Association (APA) soon after argued that the quick group assessments, the
evaluations of the experts brought by the defendants being excluded into evidence, and the
absence of cross examination of the experts were insufficient procedures to accurately determine
competency. As mentioned before, the execution of an inmate deemed as “incompetent” violates
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eight Amendment. This is made clear in a
concurring opinion delivered by Justice Powell, “I would hold the 8th Amendment forbids the
execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why
they are to suffer it.”
This where the evaluations of competency become hazy. Although executing or
sentencing an incompetent individual to death is forbidden under the constitution, is it
unconstitutional and unethical for physicians that work in/or with correctional facilities to treat
an incompetent inmate to restore their competence? This controversy lies in the fact that
correctional psychiatrists’ roles are dedicated to ensuring that they diagnose and treat mental,
emotional, behavioral disorders. Since they are responsible for treating and medicating their
patients, by medicating incompetent inmates awaiting their sentence to achieve a certain level of
competency, they are ultimately indirectly involved with the execution process.
B. Does Volunteering Violate the 8th Amendment?
The four functional abilities to exhibit an adequate level of decisional competence in
terms of legality are: expressing a choice, understanding information, appreciating information,
and reasoning with information (Cooper, n.d.). When assessing these abilities in psychological
settings, they are organized into a series of tests: a preference test, a basic understanding test, an
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appreciation test, and a reasoning test (Cooper, n.d.). However, it is important to note when
conducting the process of these evaluations, it is still possible for a defendant to perform a
rational process of reasoning and still reach an irrational conclusion (Cooper, n.d.).
Evaluating and defining decisional competency is crucial since inmates are given the
right to waive their death sentence appeal. This ensures the inmates receive some sense of
autonomy, and self-esteem through allowing them to make their own decisions, creating a sense
of humanization and dignity. However, given the context and conditions of being placed on
death row, these rights inmates are afforded is quite controversial. To put it into perspective if
Death Row Phenomenon and Death Row Syndrome were both recognized by the American
Psychological Association, the Eighth Amendment would need to be revisited of what qualifies
as a competent individual. It is widely known that State and Federal prisons have dire living
conditions which have subsequently led to creating mental stress of living under a death sentence
(Wyatt and Kapoor, 2018). This begs the question: do the conditions and the potentially altered
mental state of inmates awaiting execution make them capable of making rational life-and-death
decisions?
"Death row volunteerism,"' is a concept that can be defined as inmates who are sentenced
to death waiving their right to receive post-sentencing appeals (Dama, 2007). When examining
the paradigm of Court’s decisions on evaluating inmates waiving their right to appeal it becomes
clear that establishing the criteria of what is considered a “competent inmate” has not been
thoroughly fleshed out. The competency tests demonstrated by preceding cases do not highlight
or effectively articulate that these defendants who waive their right to appeal are incompetent.
Godinez v. Moran, bests illustrates this. In Godinez, two psychiatrists that have examined him
reach the conclusion that he was competent to stand trial. Later Godinez alleged that this had
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violated his Due Process, and that the trial court had failed to establish a criterion which would
have accurately determined his competency. The Court refused to reverse his sentencing on due
process grounds and held that the trial court’s preceding ruling had accurately determined that
the defendant was competent before accepting his guilty plea. The Court’s justification was that
a defendant may plead guilty to capital crimes if there is an understanding of the proceedings
held against them, and if the defendant had waived their constitutional rights knowingly and
voluntarily (Dama, 2007).
The ambiguity of the definition of Competency can mostly stem from the Courts’ strong
emphasis on the concept of autonomy whenever a defendant makes the “conscience” decision to
waive their right to appeal. The "next friend" jurisprudence is a strong indicator of their disdain
to allow third parties to not have a standing in challenging a competent capital defendants'
decisions to waive their appeals. Whitmore v. Arkansas (1988) demonstrates this when a Court
denied a capital defendant having "next friend" standing to challenge the waiver of appeal
because the defendant had "given a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to
proceed, and his access to court is otherwise unimpeded” (p. 1087). In Whitmore, Justice
Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented and provided the opinion, “ Appellate review is
necessary not only to safeguard a defendant's right not to suffer cruel and unusual punishment
but also to protect society's fundamental interest in ensuring that the coercive power of the State
is not employed in a manner that shocks the community's conscience or undermines the integrity
of our criminal justice system.” Justice Marshall’s perspective believes that it is the
government’s full obligation to society to safeguard a human’s life before a State hastily reaches
a verdict (p. 1087).
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When defining decisional competence, decisional competence focuses on four functional
abilities: expressing a choice, understanding information, appreciating information, and
reasoning with information (Cooper, n.d.). When actually taking the term decisional competence
and placing it in the context of an actual psychological evaluation, the four abilities are placed
into a hierarchy of comprehensive tests: a preference test, a basic understanding test, an
appreciation test, and a reasoning test (Cooper, n.d.). It is imperative to note that when analyzing
these abilities, during psychological evaluations it must be interpreted as a process, not an
outcome. This means that it is possible for a defendant to engage in a seemingly rational process
of reasoning with a seemingly irrational outcome (Cooper, n.d.). Reiterating the point about
Courts’ emphasis on the concepts of autonomy and competency, they need to clearly define
whether the fact that a defendant was able to reach a conscience, rational decision on their own
in the moment is what constitutes as competency, or the process and motivations that had took
them to reach that decision.
Aside from autonomy, those in favor of permitting inmates waiving their right to appeal
believe that another proponent of allowing to administer these waivers is that it would safeguard
their individual rights. A popular example used by proponents is that this right can be compared
to people experiencing terminal illness. Just like the terminally ill, both groups “seek to greet
imminent and unavoidable death on their own terms… They chose to hasten, rather than cause,
their deaths.” The key takeaway from this analogy is that 1) the judiciary had already deemed
death as a suitable punishment, and 2) this speeds up a potential sealed fate. This analogy sheds a
spotlight of the “defeatist” mentality meaning, if an inmate had come to the peaceful resolution
of accepting an impending fate, than it would not constitute as committing suicide if you already
accepted the outcome of the future. While these are some strong points, this parallel is still
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flawed; choosing to expedite an imminent death can still be viewed as seeking to end suffering
rather than being content with a decided ruling. In hindsight, when a State respects capital
defendant’s rights, they need to examine whether these sorts of motivations derive from the
desire to escape confinement, or the acceptance of the State’s initial decision. Whichever reason
this may be, waiving this right can incidentally lead to breeding a form of retribution.
C. Does Time Spent on Death Row Create Incompetency?
The Eighth Amendment explicitly forbids a state from executing a prisoner who is insane
based on the rationale that one should not execute a person who has no comprehension of why
he/she has been punished. However, when observing death row demographics, mental illness is
prevalent among inmates. When observing the phenomenon of volunteerism within death row,
there is a clear correlation between volunteering and displaying signs of psychological disorders.
In a statistic of a sample size of volunteers for execution with mental illness and/or substance
abuse, 77.36% (82/106) exhibited mental illness, 52.83% (56/106) demonstrated substance
abuse, and 87.74% (93/106) had both mental illness and/or substance abuse (Blume, 2005).
According to psychiatrist Dr. Spencer Eth, "when you look at people who are either asking for
the death penalty or are not actively fighting it, many of them are depressed and, in fact,
suicidal" (p. 962). Due to prolonged periods of isolation, the feeling of hopelessness is also very
prevalent among this group. In a study of attorneys’ opinions and attitudes towards their clients’
motivations which led to their decision to volunteer for execution, thirty-nine percent cited a
sense of hopelessness in the inmate's decision to forgo his appeals (p. 963). While there is no
significant research offering subsequent data overwhelmingly supporting the contention that the
time spent on death row can lead to incompetency, there are many formalities that can lead to
supporting this assumption. Popular theories such as Death Row Syndrome and Death Row
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Phenomenon both support the idea of consequential psychological illness and harmful effects of
the conditions experienced on death row can arise as result of time spent awaiting a death
sentence. Volunteerism among those on death row also demonstrates clear correlation of inmates
suffering mental illness of some sort. Therefore, while there is no research that explicitly
suggests that time on death row creates incompetency, it can be reasonably inferred that
psychological illness are even more aggravated when inmates spend a great deal of time on death
row. As a result, it could be argued that the prolonged time of a death sentence can in fact create
incompetent individuals.
D. Quantifying and Defining Time
There are a few cases which discuss the delayed of execution is unconstitutional. The
first petition to reach the Supreme Court was in 1995 with, Lackey v. Texas. In Lackey, the
defendant claimed that executing him after spending eighteen years on death row would violate
his Eighth Amendment right, through his punishment being considered cruel and unusual.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court had denied his petition for certiorari, the arguments the
defense presented did leave an impact regarding delayed execution. In a memorandum, Justice
Stevens provided the opinion, “though novel, petitioner’s claim is not without foundation” (Sun,
2014). Stevens further explained in his memorandum that, “execution following such delays
served neither of the death penalty’s two principal purposes, retribution and deterrence” (p.
1595). Justice Stevens concluded that the state’s interest in retribution and goals of creating any
further deterrence were both satisfied. Any further punishment inflicted (execution) in his
opinion would seem “minimal” (Sun, 2014). It is imperative to recognize this case and how it set
the precedent for other lawsuits like this one. Like Lackey, when cases challenge the delay of
execution as unconstitutional, defining time (regarding awaiting execution) is a topic that is
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somewhat shunned; fortunately, although the delay of executions remain constitutional, the
decision made in Lackey does leave a positive precedent. In Barr v. Purkey (2020), Wesley
Purkey had been sentenced to death over sixteen years ago and is now sixty-eight years old,
suffering from Alzheimer’s disease and along with “intense mental anxiety” from prolonged
isolation and waiting for execution. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg dissented,
providing the opinion that, the delay in execution undermined the penology of the death penalty,
which is to serve as a deterrence and retribution. Their opinion provided that both cases
presented revealed inherent arbitrariness and highlighted the problems that come with excessive
delay and risks of severe and unnecessary suffering (Barr v. Purkey, 2020). However, many
courts still reject Lackey claims. This best demonstrated with Duncan v. Carpenter (2014), where
Duncan alleges that the passage of time between his sentence and execution should be
considered cruel and unusual punishment. However, the court denied his motion for summary
judgement citing Lackey, no federal appellate court has found the delayed incarceration prior to
execution violating the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause. With claims of
delayed sentencing being considered unconstitutional continuously ignored and rejected by
courts, lawsuits instead tend to focus on the effects of awaiting a death sentence rather than tying
to the two concepts neatly together.
Collins English Dictionary definition of time defines it as a sequential relation of events
(past, present, future) and continuous duration in which events succeed one another (Collins
English Dictionary, n.d.). After reviewing many previous studies and opinions on the time
inmates spend on death row, many studies fail to make the concept of time quantifiable. As
mentioned previously throughout this thesis, prolonged/delayed sentencing can create lasting
effects such as developing Death Row Syndrome, psychological illnesses, and can affect an
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inmate’s competency. These findings illustrate the effect time spent on death row has on inmates.
Unfortunately, these findings do not go beyond the scope of fully supporting the contention of
shortening time spent waiting for execution, or that the overall time spent itself should be
considered unconstitutional.
This raises the question: is there a way to quantify time in relation to examining the
overall effects it has on inmates and societal benefits? While it is reasonable to believe that time
spent on death row can create negative lasting effects, there are too many different variables that
would make it difficult draw a reasonable conclusion. One being that when observing the effects
death row potentially has on inmates, the results are not universal. As mentioned throughout this
thesis, while there are visible effects on inmates, the results done by studies are not widely
recognized within the United States jurisprudence or academia. This is best demonstrated with
the Death Row Syndrome not considered as a mental health disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association (APA). This also shown with the Supreme Court’s refusal to reverse
sentencing on due process grounds arguing whether defendants who waive their right to appeal
are competent before accepting their guilty plea.
Although there have not been enough studies creating a direct connection between time
and the effects it has on the human psyche, the potential for this sort of inquiry is there. In a
study conducted four years ago, it studied the last statements of 70 death row inmates, who were
executed in Texas Huntsville Unit between 1982 and 2016. The aim of this research was to
understand the perception of time on among inmates on death row. Within this study, it was
distinguished that the perception of time for death row inmates differs from that the ordinary
person because death row inmates are fully aware that they are in a process to complete their
“earthly” time perception (Uysal, 2018). The methodology of this study used grammatical tenses
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and analyzed the use of these tenses to understand how the inmates perceived time. The findings
within this study demonstrated that inmates who mostly used present continuous tense, suggested
that they still avoided taking responsibility of concrete reality. Inmates who used future tense
viewed their sentence as a free of the thought of death and action. This observation led to the
conclusion that not only crime but also the death is denied. Both findings demonstrated traces of
existential anxiety, a sign of experiencing an unhealthy death process. These discoveries make
this study important because it is an alternative way of explaining that the death penalty may not
serve as an effective way of creating general or specific deterrence. As the study implies, a
person may be guilty but might not feel guilty. It is not sufficient to just accept that one has done
something prohibited, in order to truly feel guilty, an inmate needs to acknowledge the authority,
which forbids what one has done (Uysal, 2018). This study relates to my specific point through
serving as an alternative explanation of using time as a quantifiable object of analyzing the
effects of the death penalty. The goal of the U.S. justice system should be ensuring a certain
measure of positive deterrence and incapacitate capital crimes; the death penalty itself has failed
to demonstrate that this sort of punishment has succeeded at doing so. Being able to conduct
studies that would quantify time and connect it to the effects of the human psyche may help
challenge the death penalty as a punishment that should be considered unconstitutional.

Conclusion
When analyzing how capital punishment affects the general public, there are very few
significant findings that exhibits or supports deterrence resulting from that kind of sentence.
Justice Thurgood Marshall best explains this: “The death penalty is no more effective than life
imprisonment…It is also evident that the burden of capital punishment falls upon the poor, the
ignorant, and the underprivileged members of society” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972). Under the
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Eighth amendment, cruel and unusual punishment, Ingraham v. Wright (1977) confine it as the
criminal process by “(1) limiting kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of
crimes, (2) proscribing punishment grossly disproportionate to severity of crime, and (3)
imposing substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such.” Through
Ingraham, the rules and provisions states must adhere by are: it is prohibited to execute offenders
with an intellectual disability (Atkins v. Virginia, 1989), it is unconstitutional to execute
offenders who were under 18 at the time their crime was committed (Roper v. Simmons, 2005),
and it is prohibited to execute for rape when the victim is not killed (Coker v. Georgia, 1977).
The method of execution also has constraints such as it cannot “present ‘substantial’ or
‘objectively intolerable’ risk of serious harm” (Baze v. Rees, 2008).
With all the rules and provisions states must adhere to, the psychological effects that arise
from awaiting a death sentence are overlooked in the eyes of Courts. Part II. of this thesis
examined the overlooked problematic effects of death row. The effects death row has on inmates
include severe physical and psychological harm, emotional distress, body tremors, and insomnia.
Death row inmates’ demographics also consists of some of the highest rates of suicide. Other
mental illnesses solely unique to death row such as Death Row Syndrome and Phenomenon also
emerges while awaiting execution. However, even with the unique psychosis one may develop
during death row, these psychological effects are still considered insufficient and are not
recognized by the Supreme Court. Along with psychological illness, delayed executions are not
recognized as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Although cases like Lackey acknowledges
that delayed execution does not satisfy a state’s interest in retribution and goals of creating any
further deterrence, these opinions are still rejected by most courts.

36

If administering the death penalty fails at serving as a form of deterrence, lacks sufficient
evidence to support the idea of victim closure, and most of the inmates who serve this sentence
die awaiting their execution, by keeping this practice, does the end justifies the means? As of
now, under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, courts seem to believe it does. Despite
Courts acknowledging theories like Death Row Syndrome and Phenomenon, the effects of
solitary confinement have on the human psyche, and the competency of inmates awaiting their
sentence; procedural reasons seem to always supersede these findings. Rest assured; these
findings set a good precedent as to where arguments for against the death penalty can head.
According to Statista Research Department, the average time inmates spend between sentencing
and execution on death row in the United States from 1990 to 2017 averages to 243 months (20
years). While myriad of preceding cases argues who should be eligible for death and how prison
personnel should execute, a glaring component courts seemingly glosses over is the actual time
spent serving this sentence.
This thesis attempted to link the effects caused by sitting on death row to serve as a
foundation, through making the parallel that time elapsed between sentencing and execution
would help cement the argument that the continued administration of death row is
unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence. With the extensive studies provided
throughout this thesis demonstrating clear psychological harm as a result of the conditions of
death row, it is reasonable to believe that the time awaiting execution creates substantial harm.
Therefore, courts need to reevaluate the length of time an inmate spends on death row or else this
should be considered unconstitutional. This is not to say inmates need to be executed at a faster
rate. The current system itself is lengthy and still has tons of administrative and procedural
errors, therefore, it might be too risky to execute quicker. If the length of time and its effects
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awaiting execution cannot be resolved, then the application of the death penalty itself should be
considered unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
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